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Case No. 20150750-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
JUSTIN PAUL CRAFT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary, both first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp. 2012). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for, either 
singularly or cumulatively: 
(A) not objecting to the victim's eyewitness identifications of 
Defendant; and 
(B) not objecting or moving for a mistrial when Detective 
Torres made an isolated and out of context statement placing 
Defendant at the scene of the crime. 1 
Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for 
the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Fowers, 2011 
UT App 383, if 15, 265 P.3d 832. This Court reverses for cumulative error if 
"the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [its] confidence ... 
that a fair trial was had." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, if25, 999 P.2d 7 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
2. Whether the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, where the victim provided a 
description of one of the perpetrators that matched Defendant and 
identified Defendant, and where Defendant made a telephone call from jail 
implicating himself in the crime. 
Standard of Review. Defendant did not preserve this issue, so this 
Court reviews for plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r 11, 10 P.3d 346. 
Under plain error review, this Court will reverse only if the evidence and 
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
1 Defendant identifies these as issues 1, 2 and 3. 
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reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime" for which he was convicted and if the 
"evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error 
to submit the case to the jury." Id. at ,r 18 (citation and additional quotation 
marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-203 (West 2015) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2015)2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Summary. 
The Robbery of Ray Davis and His Mother 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on March 12, 2013, three men entered a 
bungalow located on Westminster Avenue in Sugar House. R392, 544. 
Alexander Ray Davis ("Davis") and his mother Kristin Ane Kirby ("Kirby") 
were living in the house. R392, 394. Davis was asleep in his bedroom in the 
basement of the house when he awoke to two men "punching me in the 
face, both with guns pointing at my head, and then I got pistol whipped." 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the State cites to the current versions of the 
Code. 
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R393, 395. Although Davis was still waking up when he got punched, he 
was awake by the thne of the pistol whipping and was able to witness it. 
R409. Davis had turned out the lights in his room before he went to bed, 
but the men had turned on the lights before they started beating him. R411. 
The men pulled Davis off his bed and onto the floor. R398. Then, 
while one of the men held Davis at gunpoint, the other searched the 
bedroom. R399. They repeatedly demanded that Davis tell them where the 
safe was located. R397. The men were wearing black clothing and black ski 
masks, so that only their eyes were visible. R397. From the skin around 
their eyes, Davis was able to tell that "[o ]ne was a darker skin, and one was 
white." R398. The men took from Davis's bedroom his cell phone, wallet, 
iPad, 1-facBook Air computer, and the keys to his car. R402, 432-33. They 
held Davis down on the floor of his room at gunpoint for five to ten 
minutes. Id. 
After the two men searched Davis's room, they brought him out into 
the living area downstairs and put him down "in a sacrificial position." 
R400. Davis described the sacrificial position as "the knees down, head 
down, hands over my head[.]" Id. His fingers were interlaced and his 
hands were up behind his back. R401. The men kept asking about the safe. 
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Id. The darker skinned man kept Davis down at gunpoint and the white 
man searched the living area. Id. 
After exiting the bedroom, the white man took off his ski mask and 
Davis could then clearly see his face. R401-02, 412. While he was in the 
living area, Davis could see the gun the darker skinned man was pointing at 
him, even though he was in the sacrificial position, because the man was 
standing in front of him and he could still look around. R412-13. The white 
man was in Davis's peripheral vision while they were in the living area. 
R415. 
In the meantime, Davis's mother, Kirby, was awakened by the third 
man shining a flashlight into her eyes. R424-25. She was able to see a 
masked man pointing a gun in her face. R425. He had black short hair and 
a big round face. R426. He asked Kirby where her purse and jewelry were. 
Id. The man then took her iPad, cell phone from her room, and the keys to 
her car. R427, 432-33. After less than ten minutes, the man took Kirby 
downstairs. R427-28. To go downstairs, Kirby had to go through the 
kitchen, which was dark. R437. As she was walking down the stairs, 
however, Kirby could see into the living area. R428. She was able to see 
because a light was on in an open closet: "there was enough light that the 
whole room was very well visible to the eye." R428, 437-38. She saw Davis 
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on the floor with a man pointing a gun at him. R428. Although she could 
see movement in the closet with the light on, she never saw the man who 
was inside. R428, 438-39. 
While being held in the living area, Davis could see the third man 
bringing Kirby down the stairs. R405. Davis described the third man as 
shorter, heavier, and darker-skinned. Id. He was also wearing all black 
with a black ski mask. Id. The men put his mother in the same sacrificial 
position he was in and the third man kept a gun trained on her. R405, 429-
30. After being brought downstaires, Kirby saw that Davis's whole face was 
bloodied. R431, 439. Next, the men shut off all the lights and turned on 
flashlights. R405. The three men started "slowly walking up the stairs, 
blinding us 1.-vith their lights, told us they have all of our information, they 
have our wallets, they have everything, if we ever try to say anything, they 
will come find us." Id. 
Apprehension of the Robbery Suspects 
After the men left, Davis and his mother ran to a neighbor's house 
and called the police. R405. The police arrived about five minutes later. 
R406. Davis provided a description of one of the perpetrators as "male, 
white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." R572. K9 officers searched 
the area but were unable to locate a track. R444-45. An officer did, 
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however, recover the two cell phones belonging to Davis and Kirby, as well 
as Davis's wallet, three blocks north of their residence. R407-08, 446-48, 472-
74. 
When one of the officers heard that electronic devices had been 
stolen, he asked Davis whether he had the ability to track any of them 
through a GPS system. R446. Davis remembered that the men took his iPad 
which had 3G cellular service and could therefore be tracked. R407. The 
police tracked the iPad to a trailer park near Harrison A venue. R448-49. 
When officers arrived at the trailer park area, they observed at least two 
people running toward the trailers. R481-82. Although the officers shouted 
at the individuals to stop, they ran between two trailers and disappeared 
into trailer 14. R483, 485. The officers waited next to trailer 14 for more 
officers to arrive to contain the area. R486. The officers then began ordering 
individuals out of the trailer one at a time. R451-52, 487. A total of seven 
people emerged from the trailer, including Defendant (SE41), Desmond 
Redkettle (SE40), and Jayvaughn Firethunder (SE39). R529-30. 
A silver PT Cruiser belonging to Redkettle was parked next to trailer 
14. R452-53, 458. The officers who searched it discovered a bag of 
marijuana, a holster, a mask, a backpack, and a G. Loomis bag. R453, 459, 
461-62. The backpack contained an iPad, a flashlight, and a set of keys. 
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R461-62. The G. Loomis bag contained "[s]everal bags of marihuana," video 
games, and a jacket. R462. Officers also discovered a Sig Sauer 9mm pistol 
and 9mm bullets in the car. R462-63. 3 
Victim's Identification of Defendant 
After the police left Davis's house, Davis and his mother went to the 
hospital so that Davis could be treated for his head wounds. R410, 419-20. 
After receiving some ten stitches, Davis and his mother returned home for a 
short while and then went to the police station at approximately 9:00 that 
morning. R418, 434-35, 531.4 Detective Torres interviewed Davis after he 
arrived at the police station. R418, 531. When asked whether the men had 
any identifying features, Davis said that one of the perpetrators was white 
and had reddish brown hair and a goatee-a description that matched 
Defendant, who had already become a suspect. R544, 576-77. 
3 Police also searched the trailer and discovered "drug packaging 
materials, drug paraphernalia, a large bag of marijuana, a MacBook Air 
computer, and a handgun holster." R137. But the evidence found inside 
the trailer was excluded at trial because police had not obtained a search 
warrant. R137-43. 
4 When asked when he was interviewed by police, Davis replied that 
it was the "next day or the day after that." R421. Davis's mother, however, 
remembered going to the police station around 9:00 a.m. on the same day as 
the crime. R434-35. Detective Torres also testified that he conducted the 
interview and lineup with Davis around 9:00 a.m. on the same day as the 
crime. R531. 
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By the time Davis and his mother arrived at the police station, 
Detective Torres had identified three robbery suspects: Redkettle, 
Firethunder, and Defendant. R531-32. Detective Torres prepared a photo 
array of six men that included a color photograph of Defendant and color 
photographs of five other men that closely resembled Defendant's 
photograph. R418, 540-41. Although Detective Torres usually had another 
detective review the photo lineup, he did not document having done so in 
this case. Id. 
Detective Torres showed Davis the photo array sometime between 
9:00 and 10:00 that morning-seven to eight hours after the 2:00 a.m. 
robbery. R544. Although Detective Torres interviewed Davis before 
administering the lineup, he did not obtain a written witness statement 
before the photo lineup. R543. And before administering the lineup, 
Detective Torres told Davis that he should be certain before identifying 
anyone. R545. 
Detective Torres showed Davis the photos sequentially- one at a 
time, until Davis said yes to one of them. R418, 540. Detective Torres then 
continued showing the rest of the photos, and let Davis review them. Id. 
Davis went through all the photos once before stating that Defendant 
looked familiar. R546. When Detective Torres asked Davis whether the 
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man he identified was the man standing by his bed, Davis replied yes. Id. 5 
Detective Torres did not ask Davis about the "level of certainty" in his 
identification. R545. 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. the same day, Firethunder, Redkettle, and 
Defendant were formally arrested. R532. 
Defendant's Admissions in a Phone Call from Jail 
Five days after his arrest, on March 17, Defendant made a telephone 
call from the jail to an unidentified woman who promptly started giving 
Defendant "a hard time" for messing up. R535-537, 553-54; SE43 (CD 
5 Davis testified that before coming into the police station, he saw a 
police report on the news about the incident at his house, including pictures 
of the suspects. R410, 418. But Detective Torres, who interviewed Davis 
and conducted the photo lineup, testified that information concerning the 
suspects would not have been released to the media until a formal arrest 
had been made, and that did not occur until later that same day. R532. 
According to Detective Torres, "I don't know how the media got the 
pictures of the suspects or the arrested parties, but it had to have been later 
on that day because we wouldn't have released any information as far as 
who we had in custody." R533. Detective Torres was confident that the 
arrests would not have occurred until after his interview with Davis, and 
after Davis viewed the photo lineup. Id. 
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® 
recording of jail phone call).6 Defendant responded that he knew he had 
messed up and said "I'm probably going to do a nickel." R.538. That 
conversation included the following incriminating exchange: 
Female voice: "Dude, that's fucked up though man. I fucking 
feel for you. I'm so mad at you." 
Male voice: "I guess my homeboys - my homeboys are a little 
crazy man. Fucking I told 'em to leave all the electronics, 
'don't-don't touch nothing like that.' 'Leave it."' 
SE43:00:35-00:45. 
At one point during the conversation, the unidentified woman talked 
about "Ashley" and asked Defendant if he wanted to talk to her. R554. 
Detective Torres assumed that Ashley was Ashley Drake, one of the women 
found in trailer 14. R530, 554. 7 It sounded like the unidentified women 
called Ashley from another phone and put the two phones together so that 
Defendant could talk to Ashley. Id. But they could not really understand 
each other so Ashley just "relayed a quick message" to Defendant. Id. 
6 All phone calls made from the jail are recorded, and the information 
stored includes the inmate's number and name, the date and time of the 
call, the length of the call, and the phone number called. R534. Regarding 
this particular call, the caller was identified as Defendant through a 
recording of Defendant saying his name, and the stored information which 
recorded his inmate number. R536-37, 553. The CD recording was admitted 
into evidence as State's Exhibit 43, not State's Exhibit 23. See Aplt. Br. 17 n.6. 
7 This portion of the call was not included in the CD recording of the 
jail phone call admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 43. However, it was 
testified to by Detective Torres. 
-11-
During this exchange, the three discussed what happened at the trailer 
park. Id. 
B. Summary of relevant trial proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant, Redkettle, and Firethunder with 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, both first degree felonies. Rl-
5, 252-53. On Defendant's motion, the trial court severed Defendant's trial 
from those of his co-defendants and ruled that the admissions of Redkettle 
and Firethunder "cannot be admitted as evidence in the trial of Mr. Craft." 
R46, 70-71. 
Motion for Directed Verdict 
Following the close of the State's case, Defendant's trial counsel made 
a motion for a directed verdict "just on the basis that they haven't shown the 
standard required of directed verdict that my client is the one that 
committed these crimes. And I'll submit it on that." R558. The judge denied 
the motion, explaining that "Mr. Davis testified and identified [Defendant] 
as the person being there. That is enough to take it to the jury, to allow 
reasonable minds to consider whether or not to find him guilty." Id. 
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Defendant's Eyewitness Identification Expert Witness 
The defense called one witness: Dr. David Dodd, a doctor of 
psychology in the Deparhnent of Psychology at the University of Utah. 
R183, 561-62. Dodd testified that Davis's eyewitness identifications were 
not reliable. R563-79. He gave seven primary reasons. First, Dodd testified 
that in general it takes several minutes to get sufficient information to later 
remember a face. R566. He conceded, however, that an identification can 
sometimes be made within less than a minute. Id. Second, Dodd testified 
that people do not do well at acquiring information to create a memory 
when they are stressed. Id. Dodd believed that Davis would have been 
sufficiently stressed by the circmnstances of the robbery to have his mental 
processes disrupted. R567. Third, Dodd described a phenomenon called 
"weapon focus" -"when people are confronted with a weapon, they are 
likely to spend a good part of their time looking at the weapon and less of 
their time looking at the person." Id. As Davis had a gun pointed at him 
during the robbery, this would have negatively affected his ability to 
remember a person. R567-68. Fourth, Dodd testified that Davis would have 
spent less time looking at any one perpetrator because his attention would 
have been divided among all the perpetrators in the room. R568. Fifth, 
Dodd suggested that Davis's men1ories of the event would have been 
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diminished during the seven or eight hours that elapsed between the event 
and the photo lineup. R568. Sixth, Dodd commented on the limited nature 
of Davis's description of the suspect. R569. Davis never provided 
information on the age of the perpetrator, and he described reddish-brown 
hair which did not appear in any of the people in the photo lineup. Id. 
Seventh, Dodd suggested that Davis's memory of Defepdant may have been 
the result of "very subtle sorts of suggestion" that occurred after the event 
itself and prior to the photo lineup. Id. 
Dodd also discussed how various aspects of the photo array 
conducted by Detective Torres did not conform with the recommendations 
contained in a 1999 publication entitled National Institute of Justice, the US 
Department of Justice, the Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement. 
R570-71. For example, Detective Torres did not tell Davis that the 
perpetrator might or might not be in the photo lineup, R571; he did not tell 
Davis that the police would continue to investigate whether or not Davis 
picked anyone out, id.; there should have been more detailed interviews and 
reports right after the crime took place, R571; Detective Torres did not ask 
Davis about his degree of certainty in identifying Defendant, R573; Davis 
should have been required to make a yes or no determination after being 
shown each photo, R574; and Detective Torres should have used a double 
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blind procedure, where the officer presenting the photos does not know 
which person is the suspect, R574-75. But Dodd also acknowledged that the 
administration of the photo array had positive aspects, including the 
selection of appropriate photos for the other five people used in the photo 
lineup based on Davis's description of the perpetrator as an individual with 
reddish-brownish hair and a goatee, and the use of a sequential procedure. 
R576-77. 
Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal 
Following the two-day trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict on both 
charges. R242-43, 250-51, 257-58. Defendant was sentenced to an 
indeterminate prison term of not less than ten years to life for each count, 
·with both counts to run concurrently to each other. R278-81. Defendant 
timely appealed. R282. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant has not carried his burden of establishing that his trial 
counsel performed deficiently in not moving to suppress Davis's eyewitness 
identifications of Defendant. To be deficient, counsel's performance must 
be objectively unreasonable; Defendant cannot establish that counsel's 
strategic decision to rely on the testimony of the expert witness to discredit 
the eyewih1ess identifications was objectively unreasonable. Defense 
counsel is not required to move for suppression of eyewitness 
identifications in every case, and in this case, given the likely futility of such 
a motion, defense counsel could reasonably choose to rely on a strategy of 
challenging the reliability of the eyewitness identifications. 
Further, Defendant cannot establish prejudice arising from the 
alleged deficiency in light of the other inculpa tory evidence in the record. 
Even absent the victim's identification of Defendant, a different outcome is 
not reasonably likely given Defendant's admission during the jail phone 
call, together with the fact that Defendant was the only individual found in 
trailer 14 who matched Davis's description of his assailant. 
2. Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting or moving for a mistrial when Detective Torres, asked if there 
were other factors that guided him in selecting the photographs to put in 
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the lineup, responded "[a]s far as the other two defendants saying he was 
there." Defendant cannot establish deficient performance as trial counsel's 
not objecting is entirely consistent with a strategic determination that 
objecting would simply draw more attention to the statement. Similarly, 
trial counsel's not moving for a mistrial is entirely consistent with a strategic 
determination that the court would not likely have granted a mistrial, and 
that requesting one would simply have drawn unwarranted attention to the 
remark. Further, Defendant cannot establish prejudice as there is no 
reasonable likelihood that Detective Torres's brief and isolated remark so 
influenced the jury that it would have acquitted Defendant had trial counsel 
successfully moved to exclude the statement. Finally, Detective Torres's 
isolated statement could not have been prejudicial in light of the other 
inculpatory evidence in the record. 
3. Defendant cannot establish that the alleged instances of deficient 
performance, even if not sufficiently prejudicial on their own, were 
cumulatively prejudicial. This Court reverses for cumulative error only if 
the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines its confidence that a 
fair trial was had. Here, there was no prejudicial error-either individually 
or cumulatively. 
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4. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that 
he was one of the perpeh·ators of the March 12 crime. Defendant's argument 
fails for two reasons. First, defense counsel's perfunctory and general 
motion for a directed verdict did not preserve his appellate challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary convictions, and Defendant has not adequately briefed 
the plain error exception to the preservation rule. 
Second, even if Defendant's briefing of this issue were adequate, he 
could not show plain error because he cannot establish that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his convictions, much less that any insufficiency 
was obvious and fundamental. To the extent that Defendant challenges the 
admissibility of Davis's eyewitness identifications rather than their 
reliability once admitted, such a claim is improper in a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, Davis's description of Defendant as one of the 
perpetrators, the jail phone call, and Davis's eyewitness identifications of 





TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
INEFFECTIVE 
Defendant argues that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in 
two ways. First, he argues that trial counsel performed deficiently by not 
moving for suppression of Davis's eyewitness identification of Defendant. 
Aplt. Br. 19-32 (Defendant's point I). Second, Defendant argues that trial 
counsel performed deficiently when he did not object or move for a mistrial 
after Detective Torres mentioned that he included Defendant's photograph 
in the photo array because the other two defendants said he was there. 
Aplt. Br. 32-37 (Defendant's point II). However, Defendant has failed to 
establish that his trial counsel performed deficiently in either case, nor has 
he established that he suffered prejudice, either singularly, or cumulatively 
(Defendant's point III, Aplt. Br. 37-38). His ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims thus fail under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
*** 
To show ineffective assistance, Defendant must first demonstrate that 
trial counsel performed deficiently- i.e., that even with the "strong 
presumption that [trial] counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance," the challenged action was objectively 
-19-
unreasonable and could not be II considered sound trial strategy."' 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 689 (1984) (citation omitted); State v. 
Gerber, 2015 UT App 76, if 9, 347 P.3d 852; State v. Daniels, 2014 UT App 230, 
iflO, 336 P.3d 1074. This burden requires Defendant to demonstrate that 
"there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 
2004 UT 25, ,r 6, 89 P.3d 162 ( emphasis in original) ( quotations and citation 
omitted); see also Daniels, 2014 UT App 230, ,I9. Defendant must put 
forward affirmative proof. "It should go without saying that the absence of 
evidence cannot overcome the 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
[fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' Burt v. 
Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
Defendant must also prove prejudice-i.e., absent counsel's deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have received 
a more favorable result below. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 
1998). Again, Defendant "bears the burden of establishing prejudice as a 
demonstrable reality," and "the likelihood of a different result must be 
substantial, not just conceivable." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ,30, 
302 P.3d 844 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Harrington v. Richter, 
131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011). A reasonable probability is one "sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 
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787 (2011) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, Defendant must do 
more than show "that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding." Id. He must show that the "likelihood of a 
different result" is "substantial, not just conceivable." Id. at 792.8 
"The failure of trial strategy, however, does not indicate 
ineffectiveness of counsel." State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, if 44, 48 P.3d 931. If 
"there is a legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice of trial 
strategy, the fact that it did not produce the expected result does not 
8 Defendant suggests that the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard of scrutiny, applied to such constitutional violations as improperly 
admitted eyewitness identifications and denial of the right to confront one's 
accusers, should apply here in determining whether trial counsel's allegedly 
deficient performances prejudiced Defendant. Aplt. Br. 30, 36. However, 
the claim that the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard should be 
applied when reviewing a claim of "constitutional dimension" under the 
prejudice prong of ineffective assistance has already been rejected by this 
court. See State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ,r 17 n.1, 153 P.3d 804, 811 
(stating that "[t]he harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is 
reserved for 'the few contexts where ineffective assistance is 'presumed,' 
such as where counsel is either totally absent or prevented from assisting 
the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding, ... and where counsel 
is burdened by an actual conflict of interest") (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
477 U.S. 365, 381 n. 6, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986)); see also State v. Beckering, 2015 
UT App 53, ,r 30, 346 P.3d 672, 679-80 (rejecting claim that "due to the 
nature of the alleged jury instruction error, we should either presume 
prejudice or require the State to establish lack of prejudice" and reiterating 
that" [t]o show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the 
defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's errors actually had an 
adverse effect on the defense and that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different") (internal citations omitted). 
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constitute ineffectiveness of counsel." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 524 
(Utah 1994). Thus, to prove Strickland prejudice, the "likelihood of a 
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. 
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011). 
If a defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or 
prejudice, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails as a matter of 
law. Gerber, 2015 UT App 76, if 9. 
Defendant bears the added burden of assuring that the record is 
adequate. An "appellate court will presume that any argument of 
ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of 
which [the] defendant is aware." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r,i 16-17, 12 
P.3d 92. "VVhere the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities 
or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a 
finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
A. Trial counsel's strategic decision not to challenge the 
admissibility of the victim's eyewitness identifications of 
Defendant was not objectively unreasonable. 
Defendant argues that his h·ial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for not objecting to Davis's eyewitness identifications of 
Defendant. Defendant's claim fails under both prongs of the Strickland 
analysis. 
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1. Defendant cannot prove deficient performance on this 
record. 
Defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to object to Davis's 
eyewitness identifications of Defendant was objectively unreasonable 
because the identifications were unreliable and unconstitutionally 
suggestive. Aplt. Br. 19-29. Although the record reflects that trial counsel 
did not object to the admission of Davis's eyewitness identifications, 
nothing in the record reveals why he did not do so, and Defendant has not 
sought a rule 23B remand to establish record support for his claim that 
counsel was ineffective in not seeking to exclude the eyewitness 
identifications. See Utah R. App. P. 23(b). 
Absent record evidence to the contrary, Strickland requires this Court 
to presume that counsel reasonably decided not to move to suppress the 
eyewitness identifications because he chose instead to call an eyewitness 
identification expert witness, Dr. Dodd, to call the identification procedures 
into question and relied on that testimony to argue that the eyewitness 
identifications were unreliable. See R561-77 (Dr. Dodd's testimony), 614-16 
(defense counsel arguing in closing that the eyewitness identifications were 
unreliable). Indeed, far from ignoring the issue of the reliability of the 
eyewitness identifications, the only witness defense counsel called was Dr. 
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Dodd, thereby making their unreliability a central aspect of the defense's 
case. 
Defendant focuses his argument on the state due process standard for 
analyzing the admissibility of eyewitness identifications adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-81 (Utah 1991). 
See Aplt. Br. 19-29. However, the actual issue presented is one of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Because Strickland is grounded in reasonableness, it 
asks only "whether an attorney's representation amount to incompetence 
under 'prevailing professional norms', not whether it deviated from best 
practices or 1nost common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 
(2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The Sixth Amendment creates 
"no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or 
tactician." See id. at 791. Defendants "have a right to a competent lawyer, 
but not to Clarence Darrow." United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 
2003). Thus, the issue is not whether counsel correctly decided to forego a 
suppression motion. Rather, the critical inquiry for resolving this ineffective 
assistance claim is whether all reasonable attorneys would have moved to 
suppress the eyewitness identifications. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In 
other words, was it is so clear that the eyewitness identifications did not 




moved to have them suppressed rather than call an expert witness to 
address their reliability? In short, the answer is no. 
Defendant has not proven that all reasonable counsel would have 
moved to suppress Davis's eyewitness identifications rather than rely on a 
strategy of challenging their reliability through the expert testimony of Dr. 
Dodd. In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-84, the supreme court held that, as the 
"gatekeeper[ s ]" of admissible evidence, trial judges may hold a pretrial 
hearing to determine whether an eyewitness identification is sufficiently 
reliable to be admitted at h·ial. But while Ramirez clearly allows defense 
counsel to request such a hearing, defense counsel may choose to forgo this 
inquiry based on legitimate strategic reasons. In State v. Mecham, 2000 UT 
App 247, 9 P.3d 777, this Court held that defense counsel was not ineffective 
for affirmatively deciding not to request a pretrial Ramirez hearing and 
instead "to wait and discredit the eyewitnesses' testimony during cross-
examination, following up with a Long instruction." Id. at ,r,r 23-24. This 
Court accepted the trial counsel's belief that such a hearing might actually 
strengthen the State's case by giving the eyewitnesses a "chance to rehearse 
their testimony and further solidify their identifications of the two 
defendants." Id. at ,r 15. 
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Similarly, in the instant case, defense counsel made a reasonable 
strategic decision in not moving to suppress the eyewitness identifications 
and instead challenging their reliability through the testimony of the expert 
witness. As in Mecham, defense counsel could reasonably have concluded 
that a Ramirez motion would have been futile. In Ramirez, the court listed 
five "factors by which reliability must be determined" if there is a pretrial 
objection: 
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the 
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) 
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, 
remember, and relate it correctly. 
817 P.2d at 781 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Courts "need not, nor should they, step into the province of the jury 
and decide. the ultimate matter of identification for the jurors." State v. 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,r 30, 48 P.3d 953. Instead, courts simply decide 
whether the testimony was "sufficiently reliable so as not to offend 
defendant's right to due process by permitting clearly unreliable 
identification testimony before the jury." Id. Thus, a court's only 
responsibility is to "initially screen, under a totality of the circumstances 
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standard, the eyewitness testimony so that it is sufficiently reliable as not to 
offend a defendant's right to due process. The jury, on the other hand, 
taking all presented evidence into consideration, determines whether to 
believe the eyewitness's identification." State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ,r 21, 
133 P.3d 363. 
Under the foregoing, it would be a rare case in which a trial court 
would take the extraordinary step of excluding eyewitness identification 
testimony from a jury. Ramirez itself is a case in point. In Ramirez, two 
masked robbers, one armed with a pipe and the other with a gun, attacked a 
restaurant manager and her two male companions at night, in a dimly-lit 
parking lot behind the restaurant. 817 P.2d at 776. While the manager and 
one of her companions went back into the restaurant to retrieve the bank 
deposit bag, a scuffle ensued outside between the eyewitness and the 
robbers. Id. The robber with the pipe hit the eyewitness and instructed the 
gunman to kill the eyewitness if he moved. Id. The eyewitness never saw 
Ramirez's full face. Id. at 784. He later identified Ramirez as the gunman at 
a "showup" held shortly after the crime where Ramirez-the only person 
present who was not a police officer- was handcuffed to a fence and 
illuminated with police spotlights. Id. at 777, 783-84. 
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The Utah Supreme Court held that this identification was admissible 
even though (1) the showup was "blatant[ly] suggestive[ ]," (2) the 
witnessing conditions were relatively poor- Ramirez had worn a scarf that 
covered most of his face and the witness viewed him for only '" a few 
seconds' or 'a second' to 'a minute' or longer" at nighttime in the shadowy 
area of a parking lot, with lighting described variously as "good" and as 
"poor," and (3) neither of the other two victims could identify Ramirez. Id. 
at 776, 782-84. 
In State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926-27 (Utah App. 1998), this Court 
similarly affirmed the admission of identification testimony, even though 
the eyewitness had only seen the suspect for ten to fifteen seconds while the 
eyewitness was travelling in a car on the freeway and being shot at. And in 
State v. Hofjhine, 2001 UT 4, ilil 18-22, 20 P.3d 265, the supreme court held 
that a trial court should have admitted testimony under Ramirez, even 
though the eyewitness had viewed the suspect for twenty to thirty seconds 
in the dark, and where the eyewitness's description of the suspect was off 
by three inches. 
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These cases amply demonstrate that an eyewitness's account need not 
be error-free or distraction-free to be submitted to a jury. As explained in 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,r 30, courts "cannot know for certain whether the 
witnesses' attention was completely focused on identifying features of the 
assailant, nor can we determine whether the witnesses were mentally and 
physically sharp." But this does not change the permissive nature of the 
Ramirez inquiry, because the question at that stage "is only whether the 
proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the 
jury for their deliberation" without violating due process. Id. 
In this case, a motion to suppress under Ramirez would have failed. 
As a threshold matter, the identification procedures employed by Detective 
Torres were not unnecessarily suggestive. 9 Ramirez, P.2d at 781 (quoting 
9 The United States Supreme Court has established a two-step test for 
analyzing the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197-99 (1972). As a threshold matter, a court must 
determine whether law enforcement used an "unnecessarily suggestive" 
identification procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification. Id. If 
not, the court's due process inquiry ends. See id. Only when officers 
employ an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure does the court 
proceed to step two - it must then determine "whether under the 'totality of 
the circumstances' the identification was [sufficiently] reliable even though 
the confrontation procedure [employed by officers] was suggestive." Id. at 
199. In State v. Lujan, the State filed a petition for certiorari asking the Utah 
Supreme Court to recognize that absent law enforcement misconduct 
related to an identification procedure, there is no basis to proceed to the due 
process question addressing the identification's reliability. See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, State v. Lujan, Case no. 20150840-SC, at 9-12. In other 
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Long, 721 P.2d at 493). In evaluating a photo array for suggestiveness, 0 the 
main question is whether the photo array emphasized the defendant's 
photo over the others," i.e., whether officers administering the array-via 
"words" or "body language" -conveyed "an attitude of disinterest," 
whether they manipulated the array "to indicate their belief that one of the 
photos portrayed the perpetrator," or whether officers otherwise caused the 
defendant's photo "to st[and] out." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111-12 
(Utah 1994); see also State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ,I32 n.22, 223 P.3d 1103 
(" Clopten I"); accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8). 
Other relevant factors include "the length of time between observation and 
identification" and "the value of photo identifications compared to in-
person identifications." Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ,I32 n.22; accord Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 783 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8). 
Here, Davis initially identified Defendant through a sequential, rather 
than a simultaneous, photo lineup. R418-19, 540. Dr. Dodd expressly 
approved of the use of sequential photo lineups. R573-74. The photo lineup 
occurred just hours after the crime. R434-35, 531. Dr. Dodd did criticize 
words, the State is asking the supreme court to clarify that a conditional 
two-step analysis applies under both federal and state due process when 
assessing the reliability of an allegedly tainted eyewih1ess identification. 
The State has also asked this Court to follow the two-step analysis 
governing eyewitness identifications in State v. Gallegos, Case no. 20140571-
CA, at 32-35; and State v. Aponte, case no. 20150154-CA, at 23-29. 
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various other aspects of the photo lineup for not being in conformity with 
the best practices recommendations contained in a 1999 publication entitled 
National Institute of Justice, the US Department of Justice, the Eyewitness 
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement. R570-71. But, he also praised certain 
aspects of the photo lineup, including the selection of appropriate photos 
for the other five people used in the photo lineup based on Davis's 
description of the perpetrator as an individual with reddish-brownish hair 
and a goatee. R576-77. Further, Detective Torres's testimony suggests that 
Davis misremembered seeing a police report on the news about the incident 
at his house while he was at the hospital. R410, 418. Detective Torres was 
certain that information concerning the suspects, including Defendant, 
would not have been released to the media until a formal arrest had been 
made, and that the arrests would not have occurred until after his interview 
with Davis, including the photo lineup. R533. Thus, the photo lineup bore 
no indicia of blatant suggestiveness. 
Second, Davis's identifications of Defendant were "sufficiently 
reliable so as not to offend due process." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, iJ 30. Davis's 
identifications were at least as reliable as the identification in Ramirez. 
Davis was able to observe Defendant's face after Defendant took off his ski 
mask upon exiting the bedromn. R401-02, 412. There was sufficient light 
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for Davis to be able to see- the perpetrators had previously turned on the 
light in his bedroom, and there was light in the living area from the open 
closet. R411, 428, 437. Although Defendant was in Davis's peripheral 
vision during the time they were in the living area, Davis could still look 
around and see what was happening from his sacrificial position on the 
floor. R413, 415. While Defendant suggests that Davis's eyewitness 
identifications were unreliable because he "received immunity for his 
testimony which prevented him from facing drug charges" and lied during 
trial "about the marijuana that he had in his house," Aplt. Br. 45, Davis's 
initial eyewitness identification of Defendant during the photo lineup 
occurred just hours after the crime, and there is no indication in the record 
that he had been offered immunity at that time. See R393, 409 (generally 
mentioning the immunity grant). Clearly, any subsequent grant of 
immunity or less than truthful trial testimony would not have affected his 
prior identification of Defendant as one of the perpetrators. 
Thus, trial counsel could have reasonably determined that, in view of 
the likely futility of a Ramirez motion, a better strategy was to attack the 
reliability of the eyewitness identification through Dr. Dodd' s expert 
witness testimony. "It is generally inappropriate for a trial court to interfere 
with counsel's conscious choices" about trial sh·ategy. State v. Litherland, 
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2000 UT 76, il 32, 12 P.3d 92. And although Defendant may argue that there 
would have been no harm in moving to suppress the eyewitness 
identifications as well as challenging their reliability through the testimony 
of Dr. Dodd, counsel is not required to take every possible step in 
formulating a trial strategy. Rather, counsel is "entitled to formulate a 
strategy that [is] reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in 
accord with effective h·ial tactics and strategies." Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86, 107 (2011) (quotations and citation omitted). 
2. Defendant cannot prove prejudice on this record. 
Defendant also cannot prove prejudice- that is, a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result absent the alleged error. As discussed, even 
had trial counsel successfully moved to suppress the eyewitness 
identifications, a different outcome was not reasonably likely 
First, Davis provided a description of one of the perpetrators when he 
was interviewed by police at his house shortly after the crime occurred, 
stating that he was "male, white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." 
R572. Defendant was the only individual found in trailer 14 who matched 
the description given by Davis. Compare R572 with SE 41. Although 
Defendant quibbles with the description of the color of his hair, saying it is 
dark in the photograph compared with the "reddish-brown" description 
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given by Davis, see Aplt. Br. 45, the color in the photo is close enough to 
"reddish-brown" that Davis's description of the perpetrator could certainly 
apply to Defendant. Moreover, although Defendant suggests that Davis's 
description also fit another white male eventually found in the trailer, 
Dustin Kilpack, this assertion is incorrect as Dustin Kilpack did not have a 
goatee. See SE 42. In fact, none of the other individuals found in the trailer 
had a goatee. See SE 36-42. 
Second, there is the evidence of the phone call Defendant made from 
jail on March 17, 2013, five days after the crime. First, Detective Torres's 
testimony establishes that Defendant, and not another inmate, made the jail 
phone call. All phone calls made from the jail are recorded, and the 
information stored includes the inmate's number and name, the date and 
time of the call, the length of the call, and the phone number called. R534. 
In the call at issue here, the caller was identified as Defendant through a 
recording of Defendant saying his name, and the stored information which 
recorded his inmate nmnber. R536-37, 553. Moreover, although Defendant 
suggested that he could have made the call and then given the phone to 
another inmate, Detective Torres stated that he had reviewed approximately 
one and a half hours of Defendant's phone calls from jail, and that the 
person in the March 17 phone call "was pretty much the same one as the 
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other hour and a half of phone conversations." R539. Thus, the evidence 
establishes that Defendant made the March 17 jail phone call. 
Although Defendant attempts to minimize the inculpatory nature of 
his jail phone call by calling it "ambiguous," he in fact tacitly confesses in 
the call to being one of the perpetrators of the March 12 crime. When the 
unidentified woman in the call started giving Defendant "a hard time" for 
messing up, Defendant responded that he knew and said "I'm probably 
going to do a nickel," thereby predicting that he is going to prison. R537-38. 
He further acknowledges his own role in the crime by stating: "I guess my 
homeboys-my homeboys are a little crazy man. Fucking I told 'em to 
leave all the electronics, 'don't-don't touch nothing like that.' 'Leave it."' 
SE43: 00:35-00:45. Defendant claims that this statement is ambiguous 
because it "lacks any contextual information about who, what, when or why 
it is being uttered." Aplt. Br. 47. However, there is in fact ample contextual 
evidence linking Defendant's statement to the March 12 crime. Defendant 
explicitly referenced his role in telling his "homeboys" to leave the 
electronics, just five days after the commission of a crime which resulted in 
the theft of numerous pieces of electronic equipment. Moreover, one of the 
women found in trailer 14 along with Defendant was Ashley Drake. R529-
30; State's Exhibit 38. Although the recipient of the call was an unidentified 
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woman, at one point during the call this unidentified woman called Ashley 
from another phone and put the two phones together so that Defendant 
could talk to Ashley. R554. Defendant and Ashley briefly spoke and 
discussed what had occurred at the trailer park. Id. Thus, during this 
phone call Defendant spoke about what had occurred at the trailer park 
with someone who had been there, referenced his role in the crime with his 
statement that he told his homeboys to leave the electronics, and predicted 
that he would be going to prison. These statements constitute a tacit 
confession that he was one of the perpetrators of the crime. 
In sum, even absent Davis's identification, the evidence of 
Defendant's guilt is compelling: Defendant was the only individual found 
in trailer 14 who matched the description given by Davis, and Davis 
thereafter acknowledged his participation in the robbery in a telephone call 
from jail. An innocent man sitting in jail on charges of aggravated robbery 
and burglary does not agree that he "messed up," predict that he will spend 
5 years in prison, and complain that his cohorts disregarded his instructions 
not to take electronics- the items which allowed the police to track them 
down. Thus, even absent the alleged error, there is not a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt that Defendant 
was one of the perpetrators of the March 12 robbery and burglary. 
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Accordingly, Defendant also has not established prejudice arising from trial 
counsel's allegedly deficient performance. 
B. Trial counsel's strategic decision not to challenge Detective 
Torres's isolated and out-of-context statement placing 
Defendant at the scene of the crime was not objectively 
unreasonable. 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was also ineffective because he 
did not object or move for a mistrial when Detective Torres mentioned that 
he included Defendant's photograph in the photo array because the other 
two defendants said he was there. Aplt. Br. 32-37. In a pretrial decision, the 
judge had ruled that the codefendants' statements to police were 
inadmissible at Defendant's trial. R46, 70-71. But during questioning about 
the compilation of the photo array, Detective Torres referenced the 
codefendants' statements that Defendant was there at the robbery. That 
brief reference was the result of a misunderstanding of the prosecutor's 
question and the prosecutor quickly clarified: 
Prosecutor: Okay. And the defense counsel mentioned hair, 
goatee and white skin as the characteristics 
discussed with Alex [Davis] during his 
description before the lineup, correct? 
Det. Torres: Yes. 
Prosecutor: Aside from those, are there any other factors 
other than just the shnilarity to the defendant 
that guided you in selecting the lineup 
photographs? 
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Det. Torres: As far as the other two defendants saying he 
was there. 
Prosecutor: No. Let me - the - when you were picking the 
photographs out -
Det. Torres: Oh. 
Prosecutor: - was there any other information - you said 
that Alex mentioned his hair, the goatee and the 
fact that he was white -
Det. Torres: Light skinned. 
Prosecutor: - this other individual. Was there any other 
information that you used when you were 
picking the photographs, other than saying does 
this person - you already said this - does this 
person look like Justin Craft? 
Det. Torres: I don't understand the question. 
Prosecutor: Did you look at any other features aside from 
hair, goatee and white skin when you were 
picking the lineup photos -
Det. Torres: No. 
Prosecutor: Other than comparing them to the defendant 
and seeing if they looked like the defendant? 
Det. Torres: No. 
R551-52. Defendant's ineffectiveness challenge to trial counsel's handling of 
the detective's reference fails under both prongs of the Strickland analysis. 
1. Defendant cannot prove deficient performance on this 
record. 
Defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to object to the 
"improper hearsay evidence" and to move for a mish·ial was objectively 
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unreasonable "because of the prejudicial impact of the hearsay statement" 
placing Defendant at the crime scene. Aplt. Br. 33. Although the record 
reflects that trial counsel did not object or move for a mistrial when 
Detective Torres made his statement, nothing in the record reveals why he 
did not do so. Defendant assumes that by objecting to Torres's statement or 
by moving for a mistrial, trial counsel would have been able to mitigate the 
"improper and inflammatory" nature of the remark. Aplt. Br. 34-35. 
Nothing in the record supports such an assumption, and Defendant has not 
sought a rule 23B remand to establish record support for his claim. See Utah 
R. App. P. 23(b). 
Absent record evidence to the contrary, Strickland requires this Court 
to presume that counsel reasonably decided not to object because Torres' s 
statement was isolated enough that counsel could forego an objection in 
order to avoid drawing attention to the statement. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689; see also Laffertt; v. State, 2007 UT 73, ljf26, 175 P.3d 530 (court presumes 
counsel acted reasonably absent contrary evidence). Detective Torres made 
the statement in the course of being questioned by the prosecutor as to the 
factors that guided him in selecting the photographs to put in the lineup. 
R551. It is readily apparent that Detective Torres misunderstood the 
prosecutor's question, and instead explained why Defendant's photograph 
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was included in the array: "As far as the other two defendants saying he 
was there." Id. As soon as Detective Torres made the statement, however, 
the prosecutor intervened, explaining that he meant to ask whether there 
were any identifying features other than hair, goatee, and white skin that 
Detective Torres had used when picking out the lineup photos. R551-52. 
Detective Torres proceeded to answer the question by explaining that there 
were not, and the questioning moved on to Defendant's telephone call from 
jail. R552. The prosecutor did not thereafter mention or use Detective 
Torres's statement during the remainder of the trial, including during jury 
insh·uctions and closing arguments. 
In light of the brief and isolated nature of Detective Torres' s 
comment, trial counsel's not objecting is entirely consistent with a strategic 
determination that objecting would simply draw more attention to the 
statement. Trial counsel could reasonably assume that, as the statement 
was made out of context and the prosecutor immediately turned the 
questioning back to the photo lineup, the statement would carry little, if 
any, weight with the jury and that actively drawing the jury's attention to 
the statement would damage his client's defense. See, e.g., State v. Arriaga, 
2012 UT App 295, ~,r 23-24, 288 P.3d 588, 594 (concluding that counsel was 
not ineffective in deciding not to seek admission of evidence regarding 
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victim's involvement on drug charges, where admission of such evidence 
would have called further attention to defendant's illegal drug activities); 
State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ,I 72, 125 P.3d 878 (concluding that counsel had 
not been ineffective in withdrawing her objection to the admission of 
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial information as counsel "may have felt 
that the objection was futile and chose not to object for strategic reasons 
(such as not drawing attention to this unfortunate information)"). 
Strickland further requires this Court to presume that counsel 
reasonably decided not to move for a mistrial. In light of the isolated nature 
of Detective Torres's remark, it was unlikely the judge would have granted 
a mistrial. In "view of the practical necessity of avoiding mistrials and 
getting litigation finished," a "trial court should not grant a mistrial except 
where the circumstances are such as to reasonably indicate ... that a fair 
trial cannot be had and that a mistrial is necessary to avoid injustice." State 
v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, if46, 27 P.3d 1133 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Moreover, Utah "case law amply reveals that a mistrial is not 
required where an improper statement is not intentionally elicited, is made 
in passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony 
presented." State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, if 40, 108 P.3d 730. In State v. Wach, 
2001 UT 35, if if 44-46, 24 P.3d 948, for example, the supreme court held that a 
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mistrial was not required after a witness violated a pretrial stipulation by 
referring to the defendant's prior bad acts. The supreme court reasoned 
that the statement was "not elicited by the prosecutor," was an "isolated, 
off-hand remark buried in roughly 244 pages of testimony," and was "not 
necessarily inflammatory." Id. at ~46. Thus, in this case trial counsel could 
have reasonably concluded that it was unlikely the judge would have 
granted a mistrial and that requesting one would simply have drawn 
unwarranted attention to the remark. 
Thus, because Defendant cannot show that "no reasonably competent 
attorney would have acted similarly," Harvey v. Warden, 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 
(11th Cir. 2011), the deficient performance claim fails. 
2. Defendant cannot prove prejudice on this record. 
Defendant also has not demonstrated prejudice. Even if trial counsel 
could have successfully moved to exclude Detective Torres's statement, 
there is not a reasonable probability that the ultimate result below would 
have been more favorable to Defendant. Given the brief and isolated nature 
of Detective Torres' s remark, it is purely speculative that the jury gave any 
weight at all to the remark during its deliberations. The remark was not 
solicited by the prosecution and was made out of context. The prosecutor 
did not reference the remark in closing argument, and no one mentioned it 
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during jury instructions. See State v. Ashby, 2015 UT App 169, 147, 357 P.3d 
554 (sending DVD of victim interview into deliberations not prejudicial 
where the "record does not suggest that the jury actually played the DVD .. 
. during its deliberations"); see also State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 154, 299 P.3d 
892 (failing to admonish jury not prejudicial where "there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that the failures to admonish played any role in the juror's 
conduct"). There is no reasonable likelihood that Detective Torres' s brief 
and isolated remark so influenced the jury that it would have acquitted 
Defendant had trial counsel successfully moved to exclude the statement. 
Moreover, as discussed, Detective Torres's isolated statement could not 
have been prejudicial in light of the other inculpatory evidence in the 
record, namely the highly incriminating nature of the statements made by 
Defendant in his jail telephone call and the fact that Defendant was the only 
individual found in trailer 14 who matched the description given by Davis. 
See supra, at 35-39. 
C. Defendant has not shown cumulative error. 
Finally, Defendant also asks for relief under the cumulative error 
doctrine. Aplt. Br. 37-38. This Court reverses for cumulative error only if 
"the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [its] confidence ... 
that a fair trial was had." Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,I25 (quotations and citation 
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omitted). For the reasons explained above, there was no error, let alone 
prejudicial error, in this case- either individually or cumulatively. And in 
any case, even absent both Davis's identification and Detective Torres' s 
brief reference to the codefendants' statement placing Defendant at the 
scene, there was not a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Given 
the evidence from the jail phone call, together with the fact that Defendant 
was the only individual found in trailer 14 who matched the description 
given by Davis, it cannot be said that the alleged errors of counsel were 
such as "to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694. Accordingly, Defendant cannot establish prejudice arising from trial 
counsel's allegedly deficient performances in challenging the admissibility 
of Davis's eyewitness identifications and in not challenging Detective 
Torres' s brief and isolated statement placing Defendant at the scene of the 
crime. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN 
PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY CHARGES 
In his final claim on appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his convictions where it consisted only of "two 
unreliable eyewitness identifications of [him], an improperly admitted co-
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defendant hearsay statement, and an ambiguous jail phone call." Aplt.Br. 
38. This claim too fails first, because it is unpreserved, and second, because 
the evidence was sufficient in any event. 
A. Defendant has not preserved his insufficiency claim. 
To preserve a claim for appeal, a party must make a timely objection 
specific enough to alert the trial court of the alleged error and to give it the 
opportunity to correct the error. State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, ,r 11, 177 
P.3d 637, cert. denied, 189 P.3d 1276 (Utah 2008). The preservation rule 
prevents defendants from strategically forgoing an objection in the hope of 
obtaining an acquittal and then arguing for reversal on appeal when that 
strategy fails. State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ,r 13, 131 P.3d 202. This rule applies 
to all claims, including constitutional questions and sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenges. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r 11, 10 P.3d 346. 
This is especially true in the context of a directed verdict motion 
based on insufficient evidence. A 1notion that generally asserts that the 
evidence is insufficient, but fails "to assert the specific argument raised on 
appeal ... is insufficient to preserve the more specific argument for appeal." 
State v. Bosquez, 2012 UT App 89, if 8, 275 P.3d 1032 (citing State v. Patrick, 
2009 UT App 226, ,r,r 15-16, 217 P.3d 1150). Thus, in a DUI prosecution, a 
directed verdict motion asserting only that "the State ha[d] failed to m[eet] 
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its burden of the element of actual physical control of a vehicle" was not 
sufficiently specific to preserve an appellate argument that the evidence of 
physical control was insufficient because Defendant was allegedly living in 
his car. Id. ,r 9 (alterations in original). As this Court concluded in Bosquez, 
"[b]roadly challenging one of the elements of the charge is insufficient to 
preserve for appeal any and every argument that could possibly relate to 
that element." Id. ,r 10. 
This Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 
187, ~~ 5-8, 283 P.3d 543. Noor's counsel stated only that he moved "for a 
directed verdict of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence." Id. ,r 7. 
That general motion, however, did not preserve an appellate challenge that 
Noor's "cultural background, intoxication, and difficulties understanding 
English rendered him unable to form the requisite intent" "to commit 
forcible sexual abuse or lewdness." Id. ,r 6-7. 
Defense counsel here made a perfunctory directed verdict motion that 
lacked the specificity necessary to preserve his current appellate arguments. 
After the State rested, counsel stated only that he was moving for a directed 
verdict of acquittal on all charges "just on the basis that they haven't shown 
the standard required of directed verdict that my client is the one that 
committed these crimes. And I'll submit it on that." R.558. Counsel's 
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nonspecific, perfunctory motion did not alert the trial court to the alleged 
deficiencies in the evidence that Defendant now argues. His arguments are 
therefore unpreserved, and this Court will not address them absent a 
showing of an exception to the preservation rule, such as plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, iJ 11. 
Defendant asserts his sufficiency challenges were preserved and thus 
argues as if they were. See Aplt. Br. at 38-48. It is only at the end of his 
argument that he acknowledges the possibility that these claims were 
unpreserved. Id. at 47-48. He then asserts that this Court may nonetheless 
review his sufficiency challenges for plain error, but provides nothing more 
in support than citation to the plain error standard and conclusory 
statements that he meets that standard. Id. Defendant completely fails to 
analyze his insufficiency claim through the lens of those standards. Such 
inadequate briefing falls far short of satisfying Defendant's burden to show 
obvious error. See State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, iJ 40, 355 P.3d 1031 ("Bald 
assertions and platitudes are not enough to satisfy an appellant's burden to 
provide an adequate argmnent on appeal."). 
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B. Defendant has not shown that the evidence was insufficient 
to support his convicti_ons, much less that any insufficiency 
was obvious and fundamental. 
Because Defendant has not adequately briefed his plain error claim, 
he "has failed to carry his burden of persuasion." See State v. Roberts, 2015 
UT 24, ,r 20, 345 P.3d 1226. As stated above, to establish plain error in a 
sufficiency challenge, Defendant must show: (1) that the evidence viewed in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict was insufficient to support 
conviction of the charged crime and (2) the insufficiency was "so obvious 
and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the 
jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r,r 17-18. Defendant has shown neither. 
The crux of Defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge is his 
argument that the eyewitness identifications were insufficient to place him 
at the scene of the crime because they were unreliable under Ramirez. Aplt. 
Br. 45-46. But although Defendant couches his challenge to the eyewitness 
identifications as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, he is in effect 
challenging their constitutional admissibility. See id. In Ramirez, the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted a state due process standard for analyzing 
eyewitness identification evidence. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-81 
(Utah 1991). Thus, the factors identified by the Court in Ramirez establish 
"the analytical model to be used by a trial court in determining the 
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admissibility of arguably suggestive eyewitness identification." Id. 
Defendant's argument therefore essentially amounts to a challenge to the 
admissibility of Davis's eyewitness identifications rather than to their 
reliability once admitted. See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 2014 UT App 166, 
,I15, 331 P.3d 1128 (holding that Christensen's argument was not properly 
framed as sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge because once evidence is 
admitted without objection, it is properly submitted to jury and relied 
upon). 
This Court should reject Defendant's attempt to resuscitate a Ramirez 
objection that was not raised before the trial court by cloaking it as a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained, "a reviewing court" on a sufficiency claim "must 
consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless whether 
that evidence was admitted erroneously." McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 
131 (2010). Similarly, in State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court distinguished trial error - such as erroneous admission of 
evidence - from evidentiary insufficiency because trial error concerned the 
process by which the conviction was obtained, not a failure of proof. Id. at 
347. Because trial error is essentially a failure of process, the remedy is 
further process: "The state and the accused share the right to a fair, error-
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free determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the double 
jeopardy clause may not deny either side that right." Id. This is true even 
where the exclusion of erroneously-admitted evidence seems to render the 
evidence insufficient: "Where the appellate court holds admission of 
evidence error, leaving insufficient evidence to support the conviction, it 
would be difficult to determine what other evidence the prosecution might 
have presented had it not succeeded in getting in the evidence which the 
appellate court considers inadmissible." Id. at 347 n.23 ( quotation omitted). 
The same analysis applies to Defendant's challenge to Detective Torres's 
isolated statement placing him at the scene of the crime, which is properly 
viewed as a challenge to the admissibility of the statement, rather than as a 
sufficiency of the evidence challenge. See Aplt. Br. 47. 
In support of his insufficiency claim, Defendant notes that he was not 
found in possession of the stolen items and that neither his fingerprints nor 
DNA were found on items connected with the robbery. Aplt. Br. 44-45. 
That is undoubtedly h·ue. But it is not necessary that a defendant be found 
with the stolen goods in his possession before he can be convicted of a 
robbery or burglary. Nor is it necessary that forensic evidence link him to 
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the crimes. If that were the case, few crimes would result in conviction. 10 
Indeed, a reviewing court does "not ... measure the sufficiency of the 
evidence against a hypothetical-CS! based-investigative ideal. Instead of 
imagining the evidence that might have been presented," reviewing courts 
"consider the evidence that was presented, and evaluate its sufficiency 
through a lens that gives the jury's verdict the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences." State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, if 53, 349 P.3d 664. Under this 
standard, the evidence was more than sufficient to establish that Defendant 
was one of the three men who committed the crime. 
Davis gave a description of one of the perpetrators immediately after 
the crime which 1natched only one individual found in trailer 14-
Defendant. Defendant made a telephone call from jail only five days after a 
crime involving the theft of electronics in which he referenced the fact that 
he would be spending time in prison and that he had warned his 
"homeboys" not to take any electronics. 
Moreover, Davis twice identified Defendant as one of the perpetrators 
of the crime in his home. R:402, 546. Defendant claims that the eyewitness 
identifications were insufficient to place Defendant at the scene of the crime 
10 As Detective Torres explained at h·ial, no DNA testing or 
fingerprinting was done on evidence in the case because the suspects had 
been wearing gloves. R.551. 
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because the circumstances surrounding Davis's eyewitness identifications of 
Defendant were less than ideal. Aplt. Br. 45-46. But this argument 1nisses 
the point. The jury credited that testimony- even after extensive testimony 
from a defense expert, explaining how the limitations of human perception 
and memory, as well as various aspects of the photo lineup conducted by 
Detective Torres, could have rendered Davis's eyewitness identifications 
unreliable. R.562-77. Once jurors are properly advised concerning the 
potential problems with eyewitness identification- as they were in this 
case-the question of whether such witnesses are credible is left to the jury. 
See State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 1 36, 223 P.3d 1103 (expert testimony 
concerning limitations of eyewitness testimony does not impinge on jury's 
role as sole judge of witness credibility). Accordingly, Defendant's 
challenge to the credibility of Davis's eyewitness identifications fails as this 
is a question left to the sole province of the jury. See Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ,r 
19, 210 P.3d 288 (defendants cannot challenge testimony based on 
"generalized concerns about a witness's credibility"). 
In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the 
evidence consisting of Davis's description of Defendant as one of the 
perpetrators, the jail phone call, and Davis's eyewitness identifications of 
Defendant, supports Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and 
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aggravated burglary. That Defendant was a perpetrator of the March 12 
crime was a permissible and reasonable conclusion from the evidence. And 
Defendant certainly cannot show an insufficiency that "was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred" by not catching it on its own. State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 117. His sufficiency of the evidence challenge thus 
fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on May 31, 2016. 
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